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Village Elections and Their Impact: An Investigative  
Report of a Northern Chinese Village 
  
The State of the Field and the Rationale of This Study 
 
Since their experimental stage officially launched in 1987, especially since the 
promulgation of the organic law of the village committees in 1998, China’s village 
elections have drawn much attention and debate as to their character, impact and 
implications.  After twenty some years into the elections, it is appropriate to pause and 
reflect on what we know about the field and where to go next. Last year a group of 
political scientists who had done much work in the field organized a forum in the Journal 
of Contemporary China to do just that.  Kevin O’Brien, one of the best known in the field, 
and Rongbin Han, contributed a central piece assessing the status of China’s elections 
and the state of the field.  O’Brien and Han state, “Election procedures in rural China 
have improved greatly over the last 20 years and a good number of reasonably free and 
fair elections have been held” (O’Brien and Han, 2009: 359).  Based on vital statistics on 
these elections presented by many Chinese and international scholars and observers, they 
conclude, “By many indicators, the future of grassroots democracy in China is bright, 
much as Tianjian Shi foresaw some years ago” (O’Brien and Han, 2009: 360).  On the 
other hand, they see a serious lag in China’s rural democratization that “changes in the 
“exercise of power’ (governance) have not kept up with changes in the ‘access to power’ 
(elections)” (O’Brien and Han, 2009:359). 
Viewing “the mountain of evidence” in the existing literature, O’ Brien and Han point 
out a general bias in research focusing on procedural study of elections without due 
attention to governance. This approach “leads analysts to over emphasize form at the 
expense of content”(O’Brien and Han, 2009: 360).  For the future study, they propose to 
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shift the focus from “access to power” to “exercise of power.”  To address the research 
bias and to explain the gap between much improved elections and little improved 
governance, O’Brien and Han examine the power configuration in the grassroots politics 
that puts constraints on village committee including township, Party branch and social 
forces from clans, religious organizations and criminal elements. They come to the 
conclusion that “…the quality of democracy in much of the countryside remains 
stubbornly low, mainly because village committees, once an election is over, are situated 
in a sociopolitical environment that has changed surprisingly little”(O’Brien and Han, 
2009: 376). 
The problem with their analysis of institutional constraints is the assumption that 
popularly elected village committee is an agent for democratic change, only various 
formal institutions and informal forces around it prevent it from doing so. For various 
reasons, however, elected officials in many villages do not try to govern democratically.  
In their study of the effect of the incentive structure—mainly the salary—on village 
officials, James Kung, Yongshun Cai and Xiulin Sun conclude, “when village cadres face 
competing demands from their families, the village community and the state, they tend to 
give priority to state tasks first, …and they put community needs last” (James Kung, 
Yongshun Cai and Xiulin Sun, 2009: 61).  In this study, I will show more factors, 
personal and structural, for elected officials not to govern democratically or in public 
interests.  Another problem with this approach is that by focusing on the power structure 
in which village committee is embedded, we cannot learn the actual dynamic of village 
politics, for example, factionalism, which, I will show below, cuts across these formal 
institutions or informal groups.  When village director and the Party secretary are of the 
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same faction, the institutional divide seems to be meaningless, providing no checks and 
balances.  O’Brien and Han recognize the limit of their institutional approach in the study 
of village governance and suggest a set of specific questions for further study including 
“how, when and where elections have changed the relationship between cadres and 
voters;” “whether elections deter power holders from seeking personal gain above all 
else;” and whether “limited changes in governance after several rounds of elections a 
cause of increasing voter apathy”(O’Brien and Han, 2009: 377-378)1  These questions 
overlap with some of those I am addressing in this article and their demand for a change 
in research approach also coincides with what I am doing here. 
With the one possible exception, other scholars in the forum more or less agree with 
O’Brien and Han’s assessment of the status of China’s village elections and proposal to 
shift focus to post-elections governance.2  However, Melanie Manion, John James 
Kennedy and Bjorn Alpermann all seem to disagree with their assessment that a large gap 
exists between (much improved) elections and (little improved) governance. Emphasizing 
a positive correlation between the quality of village elections and of governance, they see 
more positive changes in rural democratization beyond improved elections.3  These three 
scholars represent the views of the majority in the field that we may call “the 
empowerment school,” while O’Brien and Han may be seen as two who are parting ways 
with the school but not yet joined the opposite “disempowerment school,” definitely the 
minority in the field.4  
In their discussion of research methodology, O’Brien and Han, implicitly, while 
Melanie Manion and Gunter Schubert, directly, call for more case studies.  Shubert, in 
particular, proposes “a new approach” closer to the one used by anthropologists 
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(Schubert, 2009: 387-388).  To address the bias of over-emphasis on procedure rather 
than content and the imbalance of the field dominated by political scientists it is 
necessary to have more fine-grained case studies.  While anthropological studies of 
village elections by Chinese scholars are numerous, they are few and far between in the 
English literature.  Zongze Hu published an ethnographical study of a North China village 
while I made one of a village near Beijing. 5  Different from macro studies that dominate 
the field, what a case study can do is to help us discern the causal mechanisms at work, 
thus enhance our knowledge about how and why these elections work or do not work.  
For example, Hu’s article analyzes how and why the majority villagers reacted negatively 
to a good democratic election and supervision, while mine illustrates how and why direct 
elections led to factional politics and continued popular discontent after the change of 
leadership.   
What is the rationale, then, for another study of the same village?  In my previous 
article, I conclude that significant progress has been made in the village’s elections after a 
crisis caused by vote buying during the 2004 election.  Compared with the old leadership, 
the governance of the first elected village committee (2004-2007) had improved to the 
degree that its members were not accused of financial corruption.  However, popular 
discontent persisted because the new leadership had failed to address the accumulated 
and continued problems of encroachment on the village property.  This conclusion about 
the (improved) elections and (little improved) governance fits more or less with O’Brien 
and Han’s recent assessment that village elections have much improved while 
governance lags behind.   
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Since 2007 important changes have taken place in the village politics including a new 
round election. The most notable one for the worse was the rise of official financial 
corruption and of village toughs, some of whom had turned into predatory entrepreneurs.  
The financial misconduct by officials was increasingly committed in collaboration with 
predatory entrepreneurs and village toughs.  This had deepened popular discontent and 
aroused sporadic public resistance.  What is more, the 2010 election saw a rampant vote 
buying that sent two predatory entrepreneurs to the village committee, one being the new 
village director.  The vantage point today has given me a broadened perspective and a 
sense of clarity to the problems troubling the village.  Reviewing my interview notes 
gathered since 2005, the problem of village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs jumps to 
the fore: almost everyone, from village cadres to ordinary villagers, complained about 
hunhun’r (toughs, rascals), who have monopolized the illegal business of the two village 
sand farms, and predatory entrepreneurs, who have refused to pay their contract dues 
since 2003 or early.  However, as villagers’ major complaint and the first two direct 
elections clearly aimed at the old leadership, I regarded the problem of village toughs 
mainly as a byproduct of the village’s poor governance.   After learning about the 
collaboration between village cadres and village toughs in recent years, especially about 
two predatory entrepreneurs, formerly village toughs, had won the 2010 election, I 
realized that the rise of village toughs had much more serious implications and 
consequences than I had recognized.  They have become a powerful force in the village 
and done more damage than corrupt village officials.  The dramatic downturn in the 
quality of governance and election since 2007 and the changing attitude of villagers 
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towards elections and the Communist leadership call for another study as well as 
reconsideration of my previous conclusions. 
Background of the Village and Methodology of the Research  
 
The village (I call it West Village) under study is located 58 kilometers to the 
northeast of Beijing. It is a large agrarian village with multi-surname groups and a 
population of over 2,200.  The village has 4,300 mu of land, less than half are good for 
farming, the other half are sandy and stony.  For most households, farming is for family 
consumption rather than the market.  In the past two decade, two collective enterprises 
and two private business of some scale had failed one after another, leaving villagers look 
for job opportunities outside.  Several hundred able-bodied men and some women work 
in construction or in service industry in the nearby township, the county seat or in Beijing.  
According to villagers, the village had been in good shape from the collectivization 
period through to the reform era of late 1990s.  Since then, the village cadres had 
increasingly worked for themselves.  The social, economic and political order of the 
village has kept deteriorating due to official corruption, poor governance, and rise of 
unruly villagers, village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs.   Thus, West Village can be 
categorized as a badly governed and dysfunctional village and this study can serve as a 
test case on whether introduction of democratic elections can or cannot help improve its 
conditions.   
My study covers four direct elections from 2001 to 2010, which villagers consider 
“free” (hai xuan). To obtain a comprehensive picture of changes and continuities, it is 
necessary to adopt a time series approach.  To achieve a balanced view, it is also 
necessary to conduct multiple interviews from both members of governing and non-
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governing elite of different factions and ordinary villagers.  Based on in-depth and, for 
some, repeated interviews conducted over the last five years and participant observation, 
I first reconstruct a narrative to illustrate the changing political dynastic in the village 
after direct elections were introduced.  To avoid repetition with my previous article, the 
2001 to 2007 elections will be discussed only briefly to illustrate the dynamic of the 
factional politics6 and to provide the necessary background for what happened afterwards.  
Then I discuss and analyze the impact of direct elections in village politics including the 
problems of elections and governance, the elite and popular participation and the main 
problems and contradictions in the village.  In the conclusion, I summarize my findings 
and try to explain why democratic elections have failed to improve governance in West 
Village and the necessity for forceful state intervention in curb the problem to village 
toughs.7 
Major Findings 
Direct elections empowered both the politically ambitious and ordinary villagers at 
first and resulted in a radical change in the village leadership by removing both the old 
village director and the old Party secretary.  However, new leaders could neither address 
the accumulated problems left over by the old leadership, nor govern with competency, 
transparency and accountability.  As their expectations for change failed to materialize, 
villagers’ political enthusiasm was soon dampened and replaced by disillusionment, 
apathy and cynicism.   
In contrast, interest in political participation among political and economic elite 
remained high because of high returns in holding office.  Direct elections provided 
opportunities for an enlarged group of elite to compete for office including both members 
 8
of the old style political elite (most had served in the village government) and newly 
emerged economic elite. Competing for power gave rise to strong factionalism and 
opposition activism, which helped to improve the quality of the first two competitive 
elections (2004, 2007) and provide a degree of checks and balances to the new leadership. 
On the other hand, factionalism reduced the effectiveness of the first new leadership 
(2004-2007) largely because neither the old nor the new Party secretaries cooperated with 
the first popularly elected village director; but it enhanced financial corruption of the 
second (2007-2010) because the second popularly elected village director and the Party 
secretary were of the same faction.  
With the decline of meaningful popular participation, elections and governance in 
West Village were largely reduced to elite politics.  Disillusioned with the elected 
officials and hoping for a change, most villagers accepted or resigned to vote buying in 
the most recent election and helped send two predatory entrepreneurs to the power center, 
thus putting both the village’s property and democratization in jeopardy.  Through the 
power of money and threat of violence, the two predatory entrepreneurs easily defeated 
their opponents and overcame the logic of factional politics, which had helped improve 
the quality of the 2004 and 2007 elections.   
The core problem that had aroused most popular discontent under the old leadership—
encroachment and unfair distribution of the collective property--continued under the new 
leadership and worsened in recent years.  It defined the main contradiction in the village 
today to be that of economic justice with villagers on one side, and ineffective or corrupt 
officials, and predatory entrepreneurs and village toughs on the other.  This main 
contradiction in its various forms can be found in many villages because the ongoing 
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economic transition and political reform in rural China have been carried out in an 
environment of social, political and moral deterioration and unsupported by a rule of law. 
This study challenges the basis for O’Brien and Han’s assessment about much 
improved quality of village elections and for various theories of empowerment 
representing the majority’s view in the field by highlighting the difference between 
formal and meaningful participation, the fluidity of direct elections in their early stage 
and the serious threat posed by village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs.  It also shows 
the risk of introducing democratic elections in those villages with the problem of village 
toughs and predatory entrepreneurs because the latter can take advantage of democratic 
elections and control the public power and village property with a semblance of 
legitimacy. 
Major Players and Factions 
The major players and the factions they form in the past four elections in West Village 
are listed in the order they appear.  First, the old village director and the old Party 
secretary, who constituted the old entrenched leadership (the old cadre faction), had been 
in power since late 1980s.  They were removed one after the other from their office in the 
first competitive election of 2004 and its aftermath.  The old village director, however, 
managed to stay on in the Party branch committee until today. Second, RW, a member of 
the old village committee, was the first popularly elected village director, serving from 
2004 to 2007.  He did not seek reelection as the village director mainly because he could 
not effectively deal with village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs.  With a solid 
popular base, he has continually been reelected into the village committee until today.  
Third, XM, a predatory entrepreneur, has not paid his contract due to the village since 
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2003.  As a close friend he supported RW in the 2004 election.  RW and XM form the 
first opposition faction to challenge the power establishment (the old cadre faction).  XM 
himself competed for the office of village director in 2007, winning the primary, but 
defeated in the formal election by a coalition of the old and new Party secretaries, the old 
village director and the would-be new village director.  The four men introduced above 
were born from 1955 to 1959.  The old village director and RW were middle school 
graduates while the old Party secretary and XM were high school graduates.  Except RW, 
all three had served in the navy after school.  Fourth, the five Party members who formed 
an opposition group within the Party branch, were mainly responsible for the downfall of 
the old Party secretary.  But they were unsuccessful in making one of their own as the 
new Party secretary.  Fifth, CF, born in mid-1960s, was an entrepreneur and protégé of 
the old Party secretary.  He became the interim Party secretary in 2005 when the old 
Party secretary was forced to resign and then the Party secretary through Party members’ 
elections in 2007 and 2010.  He and the old village director form a new faction ( the 
reconstituted old cadre faction), which has dominated the Party branch ever since and the 
village committee from 2007 to 2010.  Sixth, RL, born in late 1940s, is thoughtful and 
eloquent about the village’s problems and strategies to deal with them.  One of the strong 
supports for RW in the 2004 election, he became one of his most vocal critics during his 
term.  RL and a retired Party secretary who had served in the 1970s and 80s form the fifth 
faction and he competed unsuccessfully for the office of village director in the 2007 and 
2010 primaries.  Seventh, SL, born in mid-1960s, had served at various village posts 
before elections and competed unsuccessfully for an office in village committee since the 
2001 election.  SL became the second elected village director in the 2007 election with 
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the support of the alliance of the reconstituted old cadre faction.  He lost to Tiger, a 
predatory entrepreneur, in the 2010 election.  Eighth, Tiger, born in late 1960s, is a 
village strongman and the wealthiest predatory entrepreneur who got rich in doing illegal 
business. Through vote buying and threat of violence, Tiger became the third elected 
village director in 2010.  Dog, his uncle, a village tough and predatory entrepreneur, also 
got elected as a village committee member.  The two predatory entrepreneurs form the 
sixth faction, who now dominates the village committee. 
The 2001 Election:  Popular Demand for Change and Elite Compromise 
Direct elections came to West Village in 2001 and the popular desire for change was 
clearly indicated in RW’s lead of 200 votes over the old village director in the primary.  
RW, a member of the village committee, was an outsider to the inner power circle made 
up of the old Party secretary and the old village director.  He enjoyed good reputation 
among villagers for being clean, honest and without airs, while the old village director 
was considered by many as rude and “a gun for the old Party secretary.”   
Uncertain about what the first direct election would entail, RW accepted mediation by 
XM, a predatory entrepreneur and a mutual friend to both candidates:  If, according to the 
gentlemen’s agreement, he would not compete this time, the incumbent promised not to 
compete with him in the next election.  Thus the political status quo was maintained 
through behind-scene politics between the elite involved.   However, the popular 
discontent about the old leadership and the desire for change were expressed loudly and 
clearly in RW’s significant lead in the primary. 
The 2004 Election:  Downfall of the Old Village Director 
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When the 2004 election came, the old village director refused to honor the gentlemen’s 
agreement. RW easily built a broad coalition of elite and non-elite supporters to challenge 
the incumbent. What had transpired in the first competitive election reminded villagers of 
both sides of the Cultural Revolution and they indeed used the Cultural Revolution 
vocabulary to describe the struggle as between “the rebels” (zaofan pai) and “the old 
cadres” (laoganbu). 
In the primary, RW led the old village director by about 150 votes.  Desperate to win 
in the formal election, the old village director and his followers resorted to vote buying 
with petty cash, dinners, and other illegal activities.  In the formal election, the old village 
director got 60 some votes more than RW.  RW’s supporters would not accept this result. 
They put up big character posters accusing the old village director of election fraud.  
Further, they demanded investigation of questionable financial deals in recent years.  
That was directly aimed at the Party secretary, who had been in control of the village 
finance.  On the day of the run-off election, a group of RW’s supporters blocked the 
entrance to the polling station, making voting impossible.   
The crisis alarmed the township leadership, which sent a work team to the village.  
When neither persuasion nor intimidation worked, it had to offer the opposition an 
acceptable compromise. A new election was held and yet another attempt at disrupting 
the election by the incumbent was aborted.  RW finally beat the incumbent by a small 
margin and became the first popularly elected village chief. 
Four months behind the schedule the 2004 election finally concluded; but the election 
triggered political crisis was far from over.  The old village director refused to recognize 
the election result and continued to come to his office as before.  The old Party secretary, 
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on the other hand, had not shown up in his office or in the village for months (he lived in 
the county seat), for fear of confronting opposition activists who demanded to audit the 
account under his control.  Every villager I interviewed in 2005 would mention a failed 
joint venture of the village’s chicken farm.  As the outside partner breached the contract 
in 1999, he was supposed to compensate to the village as much as 80, 000 yuan annually. 
But the case has not been resolved after six years and villagers suspected that there 
existed a secret deal between the outside partner and the old Party secretary.  The 
protestors also wanted to investigate the Party secretary’s and the old village director’s 
private ventures—selling the sand belonging to the village without proper compensation.  
Although they had stopped doing this under the pressure of villagers and the township 
leadership, the illegal business was taken over by several village toughs and predatory 
entrepreneurs. 
The Downfall of the Old Party Secretary 
After the first competitive election that removed the old village director, a group of 
five Party member activists emerged (as the third faction) out of the opposition coalition 
formed in the 2004 election, aiming to remove the Party secretary.  Through persistent 
petitions, they finally succeeded in getting the township’s attention.  Their charge of the 
Party secretary’s negligence of duty—the village Party branch had held no meetings for 
ten months after the election—brought attention to the leadership of upper levels rather 
than the alleged financial corruption.  The group of five maneuvered, without success, to 
get one of their own to become the interim Party secretary.  Neither was their attempt in 
the election of the Party branch committee in 2007.  According to the procedural rule, the 
interim position should go to RW, as the only member of the Party branch committee 
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untainted by the charge of financial misconduct.  However, the township helped CF, an 
entrepreneur and a protégé of the old Party secretary, to get the job. 
Rise of Interim Party Secretary and  
Decline of the First Elected Village Director 
CF had been an owner of small construction team and a friend of the old Party 
secretary, who had once contracted him a profitable job of constructing the village 
irrigation system worthy of several hundred thousands yuan.  On resignation, the old 
Party secretary recommended CF as his successor and another older, retired Party 
secretary who had served from mid-1970s to early 1980s also recommended CF to the 
township leadership.  All three were of the same clan and the retired Party secretary said 
“the Party secretary position should never go out of the clan.”  Before the 2007 election, 
the interim Party secretary had won over the majority Party members:  Under his charge, 
a small park with exercise facilities was built (although later on villagers found a big gap 
between the budget for the project and the actual spending).  He succeeded in persuading 
the majority of the Party members and villagers representatives to accept a compromised 
solution for the case of the failed chicken farm.  In the 2007 election of the Party branch 
committee, CF gained full legitimacy by receiving the most votes of the party members.  
In contrast, the support among villagers for RW, the new village director, was eroded 
for his failure to display strong and capable leadership in dealing with unruly villagers 
and village toughs.  Villagers mentioned several incidents to show that RW was not a 
good guardian for the village property. Once, he was unable to make a few unruly 
villagers and village toughs pay for the trees they had illegally cut down. In addition, he 
failed to sell the recovered trees on the highest bid, thus draining the collective income by 
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several tens of thousands yuan.  On another occasion he was unable to collect payment 
from a few villagers who had used the collective mechanical plowing service. Some 
villagers’ criticism was probably right that RW was a good man but not a principled 
leader.  In the election for the Party branch committee, in which the old Party secretary 
still had a strong power base, RW did not get reelected while his deadly enemy—the old 
village director—did.  When the 2007 election for the village committee came, RW 
decided not to seek reelection as village director.  The major reasons behind his decision 
seemed to be two:  one, he could not deal with unruly villagers and toughs; two, he could 
not get cooperation from the Party leadership. 
The 2007 Election: Prevail of the Reconstituted Old Cadre Faction 
Two contenders came forth to seek the office of village director in the 2007 election.  
The first one was RL, energetic and articulate man in his early sixties.  From the same 
surname group and used to be a strong supporter for RW in the 2004 election, RL has 
since become a most vocal critic of the new village chief for being “weak and 
incompetent.”   Of all the village officials and candidates I have known, RL was the most 
thoughtful with an actual and comprehensive plan to rejuvenate the village’s economy, 
although its feasibility can be questionable. For some, the plan was suspicious of 
restoring to the collective farming, even if it was based on voluntary basis. He also had 
ideas to address the accumulated problems of public concern-- the illegal exploitation of 
the village sand farms, enforcement of contract terms and reallocation of land.  With the 
reputation of a mere talker, RL did not enjoy wide popular support.  This was shown in 
his twice defeat in the 2007 and 2010 primaries. 
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The second contender was XM, RW’s ally since the 2004 election.  XM made his 
first fortune sometimes with illegal means in transportation business in the 1980s8 He 
claimed that in the 1990s he had been the wealthiest man in the village. Since the 
beginning of the new century, XM’s food and printing businesses had closed down 
because of keener competition and poor management.  His search for a new business 
partner has been without success.  That seemed to be the major reason for him to run for 
office.  Besides a good salary and other benefits, the political power could help his 
business opportunities.   
Both candidates shared the same character flaw in the eyes of villagers--arrogance. 
Comparing the two, however, XM had a few advantages in the eyes of villagers: he was 
over ten years younger; he had more outside connections; (his father, now retired, used to 
be a section chief of the county police department) and more active young campaigners.  
Unlike the previous elections, there seemed to be no clearly good or bad choices for 
villagers between the two candidates. 
I observed the 2007 primary and part of the campaigning process.  At least, the 
primary election, if not its campaigning,9 was free, fair and competitive.  Besides three 
cadres and two security guards from the township to monitor the election, all the 
candidates were on site most of the time to keep an eye on the election process.  As the 
memory of the 2004 election crisis was fresh, the procedural rules were well observed 
this time.  Two hours after the booths were closed, the votes were tallied with supporters 
of both candidates watching: of 1800 eligible voters, about 1200 cast their votes.  
Between the two main candidates seeking the office of the village chief, XM got 444 
votes or 37 per cent of the votes; RL got 268 votes or 22 per cent.   
 17
Shortly after the primary, the despondent RL revealed his intent to withdraw, despite 
the reconstituted old cadre faction’s offer of their full support in the formal election.  On 
learning the news, SL, an opportunist who had lost his bid for village committee in the 
primary, jumped to the opportunity.  Under the normal circumstances, SL would have no 
chance.  But the full support of the reconstituted old cadre faction made a difference.  The 
two incumbents in the leadership—the new Party secretary and the old village director 
had the most to lose if XM was elected.  They went to the old Party secretary for help.  
Even though no longer in office (he found a job in the county’s economic development 
zone), the old Party secretary still had considerable political influence in the village.   The 
three men decided to actively campaign for SL.  In his early forties, SL had a small 
business of a meat stall on a market in the county seat.  A man of political ambition, he 
had run without success for a membership in the village committee since direct elections 
were introduced in 2001.  Related to the old Party secretary by marriage and owed him 
his Party membership, the man could be easily won over to the reconstituted old cadre 
faction. 
Apart from the effective maneuvers by the reconstituted old cadre faction, the popular 
will was ultimately the decisive factor for the result of the 2007 election.  The dramatic 
turnabout must be understood as XM’s lack of popular support.  Besides his proverbial 
arrogance, XM had been delinquent for the contract fee of 20,000 yuan annually for his 
factory compound for a number of years.  The violation of this kind was widespread in 
the village: Between 2001 and 2003, most villagers, imitating one another, had stopped 
paying contract dues.  But the delinquency of ordinary villagers could not even compare 
with a dozen predatory entrepreneurs who either possessed a dozen or several dozen mu 
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of farm land, or rented a few village housing compounds or controlled the cash cow of 
the sand farms.  By encroaching on the village’s property over tens or hundreds of 
thousands yuan annually, they should be categorized as “predatory entrepreneurs.” Today, 
only one family of the lower economic elite in the village continues to pay its annual due 
of 875 yuan. This tremendous loss of the collective property was a priority issue that 
most villagers wanted their leaders to address.  That XM was one of the most glaring 
problems in this area had been well-known and his opponents exploited it fully to 
undermine his credibility as a potential leader.  Villagers had good reasons to doubt if 
XM had political will or desire to deal with this problem.  Without this problem, SL 
could at least give villagers a little hope for change. 
Crying foul after the defeat, 30 to 40 of XM’s supporters went to the township and 
the county seat to protest.  Without hard evidence, the election result was considered 
legal.  (I heard later from sources other than XM’s faction that SL had resorted to vote 
buying) 
After the 2007 election, the village leadership including the village committee and the 
Party branch committee was increasingly dominated by the reconstituted old cadre 
faction including CF (the new Party secretary), the old village director and now a 
member of the Party branch, SL, the new village director.  RW, the first popularly elected 
village director, now reelected a member of the village committee, was further 
marginalized after his loss in the election of the Party branch committee earlier the same 
year. 
Governance under the Reconstituted Old Cadre Faction 
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With the benefit of a unified leadership, SL and CF still would not touch the thorny 
problem of continued erosion and unfair distribution of the village property.  Like RW, 
their lack of political will to enforce regulations and contract terms was mainly out of 
fear to confront strongmen like XM, Tiger and village toughs.  It was also due to the lack 
of public pressure and support from villagers, who would complain in private but would 
not raise the issue on formal occasions.  As much as the village cadres, villagers were 
afraid of offending village toughs and strongmen.  Different from RW’s term, village 
toughs and some predatory entrepreneurs became more aggressive because of the 
increased economic opportunities in the village. Under their harassment, villager leaders 
more often than not chose appeasement and even collaboration.   
Besides the abolition of the agricultural tax, the central and, even more so, Beijing 
municipal governments increased investment for rural reconstruction (jianshe shehuizuyi 
xin nongcun).  In addition, the village hit a jackpot, so to speak:  the municipal 
government began in 2009 to compensate it a whopper sum of 1.84 million yuan annually 
for five years for the land the village had given up (about half of what it owned) to the 
neighboring migrant village reallocated here for the construction of the reservoir in 1958.  
The money was earmarked for projects to enhance the village’s economic development 
and public service.  Headed by the retired Party secretary, who had served from 1974 to 
1982, and RL, ten Villagers’ Representatives and Party members wrote a letter to Premier 
Wen Jiabao early in 2009, appealing without success for distributing the compensation 
among villagers.  Sometime before this, there was a larger petition on which 97% of the 
villagers signed their names.  CF, the Party branch secretary and SL, the village director, 
were among the few who did not.   However, the way they handled the public fund in the 
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past two years was suspicious of financial corruption, which aroused increasing public 
discontent and even sporadic resistance. 
 The first incident took place in early 2008 regarding a large budget project funded by 
the municipal government for upgrading the running water system.  The village director 
and the Party branch secretary contracted the project, while having a meeting in the 
county seat, to a construction team without villagers’ knowledge.  When information 
leaked that there was a trick (maoni) in the deal, 10 the same retired Party chief, who led 
the petition to distribute equally among villagers the municipal government’s 
compensation to the village, along with a few Party members challenged the Party 
secretary on a meeting. Quoting a rule for village governance that village leaders must 
consult villagers or their representatives in making decisions on any project over 100,000 
yuan, they insisted that the two village leaders cancel the contract.  Under the public 
pressure they ended up canceling the contract even at the risk of being sued by the 
construction team.  (The materials and equipment of the construction team had already 
been moved to the village.)  What they did afterwards, however, was even more 
problematic.  With the old saying “fertile water should not flow into outsiders’ fields,” 
(fei shui bu liu wairen tian), the two leaders persuaded the Party members and villagers’ 
representatives to sign a new contract with Tiger and Dog, two predatory entrepreneurs.  
The retired Party secretary was silenced after receiving a job as a supervisor for the 
project. 
The financial misconduct by CF and SL continued in at least two other projects.  One 
was the construction of a village archway.  Instead of contracting it to an outside bidder 
at a lower price, they again contracted to Tiger with the budget of 180,000 yuan.  When 
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finished, the total spending amounted to 210,000 yuan but no official explanation was 
given.   The largest project, also the most outrageous one, was financed with the village’s 
own coffer in the construction of a movie theatre and the new village government office 
in 2009.  With their estimated cost of a million, the leadership obtained the approval from 
Villagers’ Representatives Assembly and again contracted the project to Tiger and Dog, 
who again recruited other village toughs.  When the construction was finished, however, 
the total spending amounted to three million.  The predatory entrepreneurs, now debtors 
of the village, said that the increased cost was due to added facilities and amenities.  
Further demand by villagers for officials to disclose itemized spending was disregarded.  
Before the 2010 election for the Party branch committee, five old Party members (not the 
same five who were responsible for the downfall of the old Party chief) had reported the 
case through internet to the Beijing anti-corruption agency with CF and their own names 
identified.  
There were other incidents showing increased tension and conflict between villagers 
and cadres.  In March 2008, CF, SL and the old village director decided to sell the tractor 
and the combine belonging to the village because they could not find operators in the 
village.  For fear of increased service cost, the angry villagers locked the yard where the 
farm machines were parked to block the sale.  The attempted sale did not materialize but 
the tractor was later found destroyed by a fire.   Besides these incidents, it was common 
knowledge that the village director and the Party secretary frequently dined with Tiger 
and Dog.  They were also known gambling together.  For a village without a good 
economy, the village officials’ consumption with public money was quite reckless and 
extravagant.  Like the old Party branch secretary, the new secretary hired a driver with an 
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annual salary of 30,000 yuan.  His cell phone monthly bill once reached 1,200 yuan while 
the cap for reimbursement set by the township was 150 yuan.  The entertainment 
expenses (zhaodai fei) (mainly for eating and drinking) by village officials for the month 
of April, 2008 were over 90, 000 yuan.  The village’s spending on the 2010 election was 
over 100,000 yuan; with the working dinner for the election committee members costing 
2,700 yuan daily (3 tables at 900 yuan for each).  Poor governance, financial corruption 
and fiscal irresponsibility of this leadership alienated most villagers.  The retired Party 
secretary described the sorry plight of the current village leaders to their face: “nobody 
listens to you and nobody lends you a hand.” (shuohua meiren ting; banshi meiren bang). 
The 2010 Election: Rise of Predatory Entrepreneurs 
Rumors were well around that Tiger would compete for office in the 2010 election 
when I visited the village in 2008.  Sometime before the 2010 election, Tiger paid a 
courtesy call to XM, asking if he would compete again.  At this meeting, Tiger disclosed 
his desire to get rid of the incumbent and asked XM and RW for help, thus a new alliance 
was formed to challenge the reconstituted old cadre faction.  
Never finishing his primary school, Tiger is street smart and with some business 
sense.  In the 1990s, he made some money as a broker in transporting and selling cloths 
from Beijing to Wenzhou.   However, his fortune had been made in recent years mainly 
through his illegal business on the village sand farm.  Unlike other predatory 
entrepreneurs, who engaged in sand business completely illegally, Tiger had actually 
contracted a sand farm while the old Party secretary was in office, thus at least more 
legitimate than the others in the illegal business.  In the past few years he was further 
enriched by contracting construction projects both within and outside the village.  Being 
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the wealthiest man in the village today, Tiger is also a strongman, commanding respect 
from village toughs, predatory entrepreneurs and cadres alike.  In the construction of the 
movie theatre and the government office, however, the village director did not seem to 
have always accommodated him.  This contributed to Tiger’s determination to replace the 
incumbent in the upcoming election. 
    Unlike other village toughs, Tiger seems to be free from bad reputation and even to be 
admired by some.  He is known as a kind of a Water Margin or Chinese Robin Hood 
figure: some say that he only gives trouble to village cadres but never bothers villagers.  
Young men consider him “loyal and generous,” (zhangyi) a quality highly regarded by 
most Chinese.  The example they gave was that whenever villagers asked him for some 
sand for house construction, Tiger would give it to them for free.  Tiger has good 
connections with highest township officials through his sister, who works there as a cook 
and is known for both being attractive and promiscuous. When he drives to the township, 
Tiger is treated as a respectable entrepreneur. Whenever there is a crackdown on the 
illegal business of sand digging, he would be informed ahead of time.   
Tiger used both carrot and stick in campaigning.  Each household received one 
hundred yuan before the primary and another hundred before the formal election.  To the 
active supporters of his main opponent, he played tough.  Learning the lessons from 
XM’s defeat in the last election, Tiger’s followers gathered those who had campaigned 
for the incumbent last time and threatened them with use of force not to do so this time.  
Thus, the reconstituted old cadre faction, the most powerful in village politics, could not 
effectively function for fear of retribution.  In the primary of the 2010 election, four 
candidates competed, with the incumbent getting about 400 votes and Tiger about 700.  
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In the formal election, the incumbent’s votes dropped to about 200 while Tiger’s 
increased to over 1,200.  
Thus, Tiger, a village strongman and a predatory entrepreneur won a landslide victory 
by using both cash and intimidation.  The incumbent also used vote buying but his 
financial resources simply could not keep up.  No doubt Tiger’s vote buying played a role, 
even though we cannot be certain how much. So was his tactics of intimidation, which 
prevented SL’s supporters to effectively campaign for him. But the incumbent’s defeat 
was not a surprise.  In the past three elections he competed, the incumbent, on his own, 
never got more than 300 votes out of 1,200 or above.  As village director, his bad temper 
and rough manner in handling things had upset a number of people and his suspected 
financial misconduct was even more alienating.  Three years in office did not enhance his 
popular support.  Compared the two, many villagers considered Tiger to be a better 
alternative. 
If it was uncertain about how much role cash played in Tiger’s rise to power, it was 
crystal clear that money was everything for another predatory entrepreneur’s rise.  Dog, 
Tiger’s uncle but a junior partner, was without any redeeming virtues to speak of among 
villagers.  Like his nephew, Dog never finished primary school.  After serving in the 
army, he worked in a private debt collection agency and was said awarded two sets of 
apartments by the local government for relocating the nail households (daizi hu).  After 
the direct elections began, he began to go back to the village and talked about “getting a 
little land.”  Dog is a village tough, pure and simple, with rough manner and foul mouth; 
yet he could easily win the race by giving 50 yuan to each voter over a two-term 
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incumbent of a decent reputation. In the primary, Dog got only 175 votes while the 
incumbent got about 500 votes.  In the formal election, vote buying gave him 799 votes. 
A few elite members of different factions were all very bitter about the rampant vote 
buying, if not with SL’s defeat, calling the CCP leadership and the system “rotten.”  
Unlike in the election of 2004, in which vote buying by the incumbent aroused a popular 
protest, no one made a fuss about it in public or reported it to the upper levels.  Fear of 
retribution was certainly a major cause.  After all it would be useless since everyone 
knew that Tiger had good connections in the township and the county.  In fact the 
township was fully aware of vote buying in most elections of its villages.  In West 
Village, the township had three cadres and two security guards on site daily during the 
election period.  Ironically, the township awarded 50,000 yuan bonus to the village 
leadership for holding a smooth election.  Even more ironically, the bonus was given to 
no one but Tiger, the perpetrator of the rampant vote buying.   Instead of handing the 
money over to the village leadership, he gave it to five of his most hard working 
campaigners for a tour in the south.  “If it’s not enough, I’ll cover the rest.” So much for 
Tiger’s “loyalty and generosity.” 
The election changed the power balance in the village leadership, and divided it 
equally between the village committee controlled by Tiger and Dog with RW tagged 
along, while the Party branch committee controlled by CF, old village director and a new 
person used to be CF’s driver.  With his political ambition, financial strength, strong 
personality and personal connections in the township, Tigers was predicted to dominate 
the new leadership.  In fact, he had already turned in his application for the Party 
membership and finished a training session in the township in October.  CF was rightly 
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worried about how long he could stay in office as Tiger’s predictable next move was 
either to subdue the Party secretary or to replace him. 
The Old and New Problems and Contradictions in the Village  
After three competitive elections and four changes of top officials including the change 
of the Party secretary and the three consecutive changes of the village director, the 
accumulated problems left by the old leadership before direct elections remained or 
continued to evolve under the new leadership.  In my interviews, the problems repeatedly 
coming up included: village cadres’ questionable business deals and spending, their 
incompetency to enforce rules and contracts terms, village toughs’ and predatory 
entrepreneurs’ encroachment on the village property, in particular, the sand farm, the 
delinquency on contract dues and the questionable construction deals with village 
officials. Villagers also wanted to reallocate land, and to develop the collective economy.  
These problems of public concern can be summarized as: First, village officials’ financial 
corruption and fiscal irresponsibility; second, village officials’ incompetency in maintain 
a good social and economic order; third, village toughs’ and predatory entrepreneurs’ 
growing encroachment on the collective property and fourth, fair redistribution of land 
and development of the collective economy.   All these problems harmed villagers’ 
economic interests and sense of wellbeing, and they wanted village officials to address 
them.  These problems indicate clearly that the main contradictions in the village today 
are between villagers on one side, and incompetent, corrupt officials, predatory 
entrepreneurs and village toughs on the other.  With Tiger and Dog’s election, the hope is 
even dimmer to address the central concern of the villagers because these two were the 
greatest beneficiary of the existing unfair and unjust economic and political order.  As a 
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smart businessman, it is conceivable that Tiger would give villagers a little more carrot to 
pacify them just as he did in vote buying. But there is no doubt that he will try to get back 
his investment and much more.   
Discussion and Analysis 
How did direct elections impact West Village’s politics?  What have changed and what 
remains unchanged after four rounds of direct elections?  The promotion by the central 
government of the Organic Law for Village Committee (1998) had an immediate and 
powerful impact on villagers’ political participation.  Their strong desire for change was 
clearly expressed in RW’s significant lead, without campaigning, over the incumbent in 
the primary of the 2001 election; but a deal behind the door between the governing elite 
and the potential challengers prevented it from happening.  This set the tone for direct 
elections in West Village as mainly the means of elite politics.  In the 2004 election, RW, 
the only candidate that could rally elite and popular support, felt ready to challenge the 
entrenched village director.  The opposition coalition successfully removed the old 
village director in the election; then, the Party secretary through petition, who was 
regarded by most villagers as the one more responsible for village’s poor governance. 
The downfall of both the old village director and the Party branch secretary was no less 
than a revolutionary change because it went beyond the official purview of village 
elections with a complete leadership shake up.  It reflected strong discontent of villagers 
towards old, entrenched and corrupt leadership and their great empowerment by direct 
elections. 
However, the popularly elected leaders since 2004 have consistently failed villagers’ 
expectations for change for various personal and environmental factors.  RW, the first 
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elected village director, inherited a deeply divided leadership between village committee 
and Party branch committee and an empty village coffer.  Even more challenging were 
the accumulated problems left by the old leadership, which could be boiled down to 
serious encroachment of the village property by a number of village toughs and predatory 
entrepreneurs.  Although he possessed the popular mandate, RW lacked political will and 
resources to address the accumulated problems or to adopt a democratic and principled 
governing style. In our interviews, he made such comments more than once, “Democracy 
won’t work in a Chinese village because it is still a community of acquaintances (shouren 
shehui), of human feelings and relations (renqing shehui). I’d love to work for my fellow 
villagers (xiangqin men).  But if you ask me to hurt brothers of old and young (laoshao 
yemen’r), I won’t do it.”  Villagers’ criticism of him was to appropriate that RW was a 
good man but not a good leader.  That is why that half way into his term villagers had 
already been disappointed at his weakness and unprincipled way in handling the new 
problems caused by unruly villagers and village toughs.  On the other hand, without an 
effective rule of law and strong support from the local governments, it seems both unfair 
and unrealistic to expect an elected official to stand up to village toughs who have no 
qualms in harming people and their property.11 
SL, the second elected village director, was in a much better position in terms of 
leadership unity and financial resources.  During his term, he and CF (the Party secretary) 
were of the same faction and the village’s coffer had never been so abundant.  These two 
leaders were confronted with the same challenge as RW of village toughs’ and predatory 
entrepreneurs’ continued encroachment on the village property.  Not only did they fail to 
address this problem, they were, unlike RW, suspicious of financial corruption 
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themselves.  What was more, they were also suspicious of colluding with Tiger and Dog, 
predatory entrepreneurs and other village toughs in village’s construction projects.  This 
administration seemed to have returned to the pattern of poor governance and financial 
corruption under the old, entrenched leadership before the direct elections.  Or in all 
likelihood, the new leaders after 2007 went even further in colluding with the more 
powerful predatory entrepreneurs. 
In their study of the institutional barriers to village democratization, O’Brien and Han 
have identified five major impediments of formal powers and informal forces for 
democratically elected village committee to improve governance.  In West Village, 
three—the township, the Party branch, and the criminal elements (or pseudo-criminal 
elements in this case)--played a major role in affecting village governance while lineages 
and religious organizations did not.   
As the local government directly above the village, the township failed to play a 
positive role in village politics and governance because it had intervened where it should 
not have, but had not intervened where it should have: it did not, after the 2004 election, 
follow through its promise to investigate the old Party secretary’s financial record.  It did 
not help stop the illegal business of the sand farms by village toughs and the vote buying 
in the most recent election.  It violated the procedural and democratic rules in helping CF 
become interim Party secretary.  It probably had the knowledge but tolerated the vote 
buying in the 2010 election.  No wonder villagers have no confidence in the township 
leadership. 
The relationship between the Party branch and the village committee in West Village 
depended very much upon the factional politics (discussed below) that O’Brien and Han 
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have not identified.   Clans and kinship groups in the village were the basic units for 
political mobilization; some believed that they had affected the outcome of the elections.  
However, they did not seem to have affected the quality of governance, as factions 
among the elite cut across the lines of lineage or kinship groups. Although the belief in 
fengshui and deities is popular, there is no organized religion in the village. 
Of all the impediments, O’Brien and Han identify, “Local strongmen and gangsters 
pose a far more direct threat to democracy”(O’Brien and Han, 2009: 375)  That is 
certainly true of West Village, where village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs posed 
the most serious challenge to the village leadership, both the old and the new, the 
community, and most recently, democratic elections.  Taking advantage of the disorder 
created by poor governance in the village’s economic and political transition, a few 
village toughs had turned into predatory entrepreneurs, Tiger being the most successful 
one. Village leaders, both the old and the new, were afraid of them, tried to appease them, 
and more recently even colluded with them for mutual benefits.  Direct elections gave 
them opportunities to gain political power, which would, in turn, further enhance their 
economic interest and opportunities to encroach on the collective property.  As we have 
seen, Tiger and Dog had won the 2010 election through vote buying and threat of 
violence, and they now dominate the new village committee. And Tiger has already taken 
the next move toward dominating the Party committee and the whole leadership. 
Chen Baifeng has done extensive study on the rising problem of hunhun (toughs) in 
rural China. He identifies three generations of village toughs evolved from 1980s to the 
present.  Tiger belongs to the smart and sophisticated minority of the second generation 
who had taken advantage of the economic transition since the 1990s and transformed into 
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successful businessmen.  As “the super power” beyond control in the village, village 
toughs have fundamentally changed the logic of human interactions, power relations and 
moral order in the rural communities.  They are actually both a major cause as well as a 
symptom of the deepened rural crisis of deteriorated order.  Villagers and village cadres 
are either intimidated or helpless, and “even the state power sometimes is powerless.”  
Village toughs are hard to deal with because, like Tiger, many of them are not openly 
criminal and enjoyed good connections with local officials and even good reputation 
among villagers.  What is more, some village toughs, against like Tiger, have already 
become village leaders through elections, which give them further protection of 
legitimacy.  The problem, according to Chen and other Chinese scholars, is widespread in 
many regions of rural China (Chen, 2008: thesis synopsis, 1). 12 
Besides the problem of village toughs, another reason for little improved governance in 
West Village was lack of popular control and participation in governance. Some scholars 
stress the improvement made in China’s village governance with the establishment of 
democratic institutions promoted by central and provincial governments (Fubing Su and 
Dali Yang, 2005; Alpermann, 2009).  But the crux of the matter was how these 
institutions actually operated.  In West Village, institutions for checks and balances such 
as Villagers’ Representatives Assembly (Cunmin daibiao huiyi), Villagers’ Financial 
Supervision Group (Cunmin licai xiaozu) and the system of Village Affairs Transparency 
(cunwu gongkai) were established but, like most villages, could not function.13  Officials 
could manipulate them by assisting their allies elected or by incorporating those who 
were not their allies through material inducement or pulling relations.  If these democratic 
institutions had truly functioned, they could have made village officials more accountable 
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and might help them stand up to village toughs and predatory economic elite.  
Unfortunately, villagers have not developed citizenship awareness to actively participate 
in village elections and governance.  They had not taken seriously election and operation 
of Villagers’ Representatives Assembly, thus allowing these agencies to serve mostly as 
the rubber stamp for village leaders.14  
For the reasons mentioned above, neither new village committees (2004-2007, 2007-
2010) had addressed the accumulated problems of public concern-- continued 
encroachment and unfair distribution of the collective property.  Nor had they much 
improved the village’s governance in terms of transparency and accountability. It should 
be pointed out that villager leaders in most cases have followed the procedural rules in 
governance: for example, they got their construction projects approved by Villagers’ 
Representatives Assembly and their reimbursements endorsed by Villagers’ Financial 
Supervision Group.  But this observation of procedural rules did not prevent them from 
financial misconduct.  As a consequence, villagers’ sense of empowerment was soon 
replaced by a growing sense of powerlessness, apathy and cynicism.  Based on my 
interviews from 2005 onward, more and more villagers came to believe that elections had 
made no difference and elected officials were no better than old cadres: “Whoever comes 
to power is to grab for himself (tan, lao).”  This increased political pessimism and 
cynicism had prepared for the general acceptance or resignation to the vote buying in the 
2010 election.       
More than a loss of confidence in elected officials, little improved governance in West 
Village had also eroded villagers’ confidence in the electoral system.  Yet it was the 
rampant vote buying in 2010 that fundamentally shook their confidence in the leadership 
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of the Communist Party.  To my surprise, four elite members of different factions 
including RW who was part of the coalition with Tiger and Dog, made the same 
comment on different occasions, “the Communist Party is hopeless” or “the Communist 
Party is finished.”  Previously, these four would always make a distinction between 
corrupt local officials and good Party center and its policies.15 It shows their frustration 
and cynicism to the extreme.  There are many factors for their confidence crisis: to begin 
with, vote buying in village elections became increasingly serious in the township with 
31 out of the 34 villages practicing it this year.  What was more, the township and county 
authorities failed to intervene, even with the full knowledge of what was going on.  They 
also had other failed experiences in trying to get help from the local and even Beijing 
authorities to stop officials’ financial corruptions (unaccounted overspending of 2 million 
in the 2009 construction) or predatory entrepreneurs (the illegal sand business).  All these 
made them believe that the Party leadership all the way up was rotten to the core and 
beyond repair. This change in attitude reflected a deepened confidence crisis of the 
mainstream in the political system and contradicts various theories of empowerment as 
well as the conclusion by Kennedy and others that “almost universal dissatisfaction with 
elected village cadres” does not affect villagers’ trust in the central government and 
confidence in the democratic elections (Kennedy, 2009: 393).  
In contrast to the decline of villagers’ enthusiasm in political participation, interest in 
elections among the elite remained high because of high returns in holding office. Due to 
the size of the village and its location in Beijing area, the annual salary for village 
director, the Party secretary (21,600 yuan) and committee members (14,000 yuan) was 
five to six times higher than the national average.16  It is a large sum in rural China, 
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especially in a village that was not very rich.  Besides, officials can enjoy various perks 
such as annual bonus and liberal spending with public fund on food, entertainment and 
communication.  The most outrageous is the monthly transportation subsidy for the Party 
secretary in the amount of 1,600 yuan.  He recently had spent over 400, 000 yuan on a 
new car.  For predatory entrepreneurs like Tiger, what was more attractive was the 
opportunity as village leaders to get bribes, kickbacks or other forms of embezzlement 
from the increasing number of construction projects and the recently enriched village 
coffer.  These illegal financial gains can be ten or even a hundred times more than a 
regular salary.  Because of the loopholes in the village’s budgetary and accounting 
system and the power of connections, the recent reform in “the management of village’s 
finance by the township accounting office” (cuncai xiangguan) has not effectively 
controlled village officials’ financial corruption.  RW, the first elected official, revealed 
an insider’s point of view, “The policy is good nowadays.  To be village director has a lot 
of benefits.  There are plenty of opportunities to apply for money (for various projects).  
Be sure to treat the guy in charge with a good dinner. Then give [him] a little [cash].  He 
will approve it (the project application).”   
Competitive elections in West Village led to the formation of factions and factional 
politics.  According to Chen Baifeng, factionalism is quite common in village politics as 
well as in daily life of north China.  He considers kinship groups (xiaoqinzu) to be the 
deep cause and basic units of factionalism while political movements including elections 
are the triggering factor or manifest cause (Chen, 2009).  My study finds otherwise: 
factions in West Village are invariably formed by elite members with common interest 
while kinship groups play little role in the political affiliation.  Factions formed among 
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elite members since direct elections began are stable because they are based on friendship 
and long-term interests. Factional alliances, on the other hand, formed by more than one 
faction before each election are driven by temporary interests of their members to help 
each other to win the election, hence less stable.   
Factionalism and partisan politics had produced both positive and negative effects for 
democratization:  it effectively frustrated the vote buying by the incumbent in the 2004 
election and helped improved the quality of the first two competitive elections (2004, 
2007).  On the other hand, it resulted in a serious division in the leadership after the 2004 
election and reduced effectiveness of the leadership.  Conversely, if the two top leaders 
were of the same faction like SL and CF, then the checks and balances between factions 
in the elections could not reach them.  That was an important reason for the rise of 
officials’ financial corruption after 2007.  The weak and marginalized RW seemed unable 
to function as an effective check in the leadership. 
Elite empowerment includes both competitions for office and opposition activism.  For 
the latter, a clear pattern of resistance to official abuse of power can be seen in their 
persistent petition to remove the Party secretary after the 2004 election, their challenge to 
a secret deal by the leadership in the 2008 running water project, and their report in early 
2009 to the Beijing municipal anti-corruption bureau about the officials’ financial 
misconduct.  Although these challenges helped deter, to a degree, official corruption, 
opposition activism has not translated into an effective system of checks and balances in 
the village governance. 
Most damaging to democratization was predatory entrepreneurs who would not abide 
by the rules in political competition.  Yet the phenomenon in West Village was more 
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complex.  Tiger is no ordinary village tough but a smart and sophisticated one deceptive 
to some villagers. They seem to cherish hope or illusion that Tiger, known as a 
strongman of “loyalty and generosity,” might bring about changes for the better. They 
seemed unable to see through his ulterior motive and scheme on the village property and 
the recently fattened village coffer.  Or even if they could, they seemed to hope that Tiger 
would deliver them a larger share of material benefits than other officials could.17  Was 
this opportunism of the powerless to make the best of a bad situation?  On the other hand, 
Villagers’ acceptance of or resignation to vote buying had much to do with their 
discontent and disillusionment with the incumbent, the current leadership and the elected 
officials since 2004.  It indicated a profound cynicism and desperate hope against hope 
for an alternative. 
Comparing West Village’s case with O’Brien and Han’s assessment of China’s village 
elections as a whole, we find that until the 2010 election, the pattern of elections and 
governance in the village’s first three direct elections seemed to fit what they identify as 
the general trend that elections have much improved while governance lags far behind.  
On closer look, however, the improvement in West Village’s elections was more in form 
than in substance.  It was true that voters’ turn-out remained high from 70 to 80 percent, 
elections were truly competitive and secret balloting was strictly observed. Yet this high 
procedural quality was belied by a steady decline in the quality of popular participation 
due to villagers’ loss of confidence in elected officials and the electoral process itself.  If 
the majority felt empowered in the 2004 election, that sense of empowerment was 
reduced or gone in the 2007 election.  In the 2010 election, many villagers seemed to 
have been willing to trade their democratic right for a cash payment. 
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The knowledge that this study has gained about popular participation tells us that the 
procedural quality on which O’Brien and Han as well as the scholars in the 
empowerment school base their assessment of village elections is not sufficient and can 
even be misleading.  For a more complete and nuanced picture we need to include actual 
behavior of the political participants, which constitutes the substantive quality of 
elections.  For instance, if we looked at West Village’s 2010 election per se, it did not 
seem to have violated the procedural rules.  For its smooth operation the township even 
gave the village leadership a cash award.  Yet once we went beyond the actual elections 
into the campaign process, illegal acts of vote buying and threat of violence emerged.  As 
these shady practices usually take place in private and are hard to detect, it cautions us all 
the more to probe below the surface rather than relying solely on the procedural study for 
the quality of elections.  The same caution should apply to those who adopt institutional 
approach in the study of the post-election governance. 
O’Brien and Han’s assessment of much improved elections and little improved 
governance is also questionable because the dichotomy is self-contradictory and cannot 
stand for long.  The West Village’s case shows us that good elections in terms of active 
popular participation need improved governance or the hope of it to sustain. Without such 
improvement or hope, the quality, if not the number, of popular participation is bound to 
decline.  This should again alert us to the problem in most studies on village elections in 
over-emphasizing the procedural quality of elections without enough attention to the 
quality of content and of result in both elections and governance.   
The dramatic downturn in the quality of the most recent election in West Village and 
those of other villages in the township tells us that direct elections in their early stage 
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were very fluid and we should be more cautious in making conclusions about them after 
one or two good or bad ones.  It also helps us better appreciate Qingshan Tan’s urgent 
call to create “a national electoral commission, tasked with implementing, supervising 
and adjudicating village elections”(Tan, 2009: 411). 
Conclusion 
This study examines a series of four direct elections and their impact in West Village 
from 2001 to 2010.  The issues under discussion include the quality of elections and 
governance, the popular and elite participation, and the accumulated problems and main 
contradictions in the village.  Factionalism, opposition activism, vote buying, village 
toughs and predatory entrepreneurs are also examined.  What I have found is a complex 
picture.  In elections, much progress had been made in the procedural quality in the first 
three elections (2001, 2004 and 2007).  However, the most recent election (2010) 
suffered a severe setback with two predatory entrepreneurs coming to power through vote 
buying and threat of violence.  In governance, the new leadership has made little 
improvement despite radical and multiple changes in leadership.  In fact, we can see a 
downward spiral from incompetency of the first new leadership (2004 to 2007) to both 
incompetency and corruption of the second new leadership (2007 to 2010).  In political 
participation, elite interest and participation remained high but it enhanced factional 
politics rather than democratic governance in terms of transparency and accountability. In 
contrast, villagers’ early sense of empowerment was replaced by a sense of 
disillusionment, apathy and cynicism. If we consider the substantive quality of popular 
participation, the seemingly steady progress in the first three direct elections should be 
discounted.  And the sudden reversal of the 2010 election also makes more sense.   After 
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four rounds of direct elections, the beneficiaries were a few members of political and 
economic elite from holding office and maintaining the unfair socioeconomic status quo.  
These findings, as a whole, support the disempowerment argument of direct elections.18 
If democratic elections introduced into West Village since 2001 have so far failed to 
improve its governance, why could they not work?  This study can identify at least three 
basic causes or problems to be addressed: first, lack of citizenship awareness for both 
villagers and elected officials prevented them from engaging in democratic governance 
with effective checks and balances; second, village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs 
had grown to be an uncontrollable force in the village; and third, the state and the local 
governments were unable to provide an effective rule of law and necessary protection for 
villagers’ basic political rights and sense of security.  Mainly because of these, radical 
changes in leadership have not been able to improve governance with the result that the 
accumulated problems left over by the old cadres continue and the popular discontent 
persists.  Most recently, village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs have hijacked 
elections and controlled both the public power and the village property.  Thus, 
democratic elections have gone to the opposite by empowering village toughs and 
predatory entrepreneurs while making villagers feel powerless and helpless.  West 
Village was by no means an exceptional case but a small part of the ongoing “graying of 
the rural society.”19  To address the widespread and the most damaging problem of 
village toughs, the state must play its crucial role in building an effective rule of law and 
in protecting villagers’ basic political rights and sense of security.20   
 
                                                 
     NOTES 
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1
 The specific questions they ask include the following:  “Beyond specifying the 
obstacles to democratization, we need more studies that explain how, when and where 
elections have changed the relationship between cadres and voters”; “more research on 
whether elections deter power holders from seeking personal gain above all else”; and 
more examinations on whether “limited changes in governance after several rounds of 
elections are a cause of increasing voter apathy”(O’Brien and Han, 2009: 377-378). 
2Only Qingshan Tan seems to disagree with O’Brien and Han by arguing, “Village 
elections are presently at a crossroad: processes and rules must be improved and further 
delays will only undermine the credibility of village elections”(Tan, 2009: 411).   
3
 Melanie Manion, Bjorn Alpermann and John Kennedy all seem to believe that a more 
positive correlation exists between elections and governance than O’Brien and Han do.   
(Manion, 2009: 380, 382; Alpermann, 2009: 397-409; Kennedy, 2009:391-395).   
4
 For a review of a variety of the literature that can be categorized as the empowerment 
school see (O’Brien and Han, 2009: 367-68 with notes 48-56; Hu, 2008: 612-613 with 
notes 3-9). 
5
 In the English literature, Zongze Hu examines villagers’ views on elections and 
democratic supervision in a northern village.  Although the 2003 election was “pretty free 
and fair, at least quite competitive,” and the popularly elected “democratic supervisory 
small group” was effective, Hu found most villagers were either indifferent or negative 
towards direct elections and the supervisory group (Hu, 2008: 611-631).  My study of a 
northern village near Beijing found that progress had been made in the three elections 
from 2001 to 2007 while nor much improvement had been made in governance (Yao, 
2009: 126-144).  To put them in the theoretical debate on village elections, Hu’s study 
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belongs to the disempowerment school while mine supports O’Brien and Han’s 
conclusions. 
6
 Those who are interested in the details on this topic can refer to my article (Yao, 2009: 
126-144). 
7
 I stayed altogether eighteen days in my five trips from 2005 to 2008 and interviewed 
more than 40 people, including the old Party secretary, the old village director, the 
members of the first elected leadership and those of the non-governing elite who agreed 
to be interviewed.   Most of interviewees were men of over forty-five years old and were 
interested in village affairs.  Among these, I had formal interviews with 16 people 
including 2 women, among whom I had more than one session with nine.  I also had 
numerous phone conversations with four informants of different factions in the village for 
clarity and up-to-date information. 
8
 XM told me how he had taken advantage of the loopholes in a state owned construction 
company in collaboration with its production-and-materials coordinator.  The coordinator 
would put in the book an amount of cement that XM did not deliver.  Then XM would 
sell it on the market and shared the income with the coordinator.  The illegal ways that 
XM and Tiger, who would appear later, got rich tell us about the complex composition of 
rural entrepreneurs, who almost always get positive media coverage. Another 
entrepreneur of a village near Shijiazhuag I studied had the similar problem. 
9
 I observed one of XM’s campaign workers—a village tough--made phone calls to seek 
votes with both cajole (“let’s have a couple of drinks after the election.”) and threat (if 
you dare not to vote for my No. 3 elder brother, I won’t tolerate it.”).  Of course, it is hard 
to say how effective this kind of crude campaigning would be.    
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10
 The retired Party branch secretary learned about the deal from his nephew, a village 
tough and a beneficiary of the deal.  According to him, the sum total to be paid to the 
construction team specified in the contract was 2.53 million.  In addition, two leaders 
promised to pay the village toughs 100,000 yuan for doing small jobs such as digging 
ditches.  They intended to keep the rest in the amount of 80,000 yuan.  This kind of 
financial corruption was common for village leaders in handling large construction 
projects. 
11
 When I asked a seemingly capable and principled man serving as the first elected 
leader of the Villagers’ Financial Supervisory Group why he didn’t compete for office, 
his answer was meaningful:  “I won’t do it because: one, I don’t have money (referring to 
the empty village coffer), two, I don’t have connections (referring to the support of the 
township government), three, I don’t know about martial arts (referring to the ability for 
self-defense against village toughs).” 
12
 Yu Jianrong and He Qinglian have studied the more serious problem of the rural “dark 
and evil forces” (hei’er shili), although the demarcation between them and village toughs 
is not always clear cut and their differences often seem to be a matter of degree rather 
than of quality.  As the “dark and evil forces” can be more harmful and destructive to the 
social order, they sometimes become the target of the law-enforcement.  The village 
toughs and predatory entrepreneurs in West Village are more akin to the hunhun that 
Chen studies, whom he aptly categorizes as “a gray force.”  See (Yu Jianrong, 2005; He, 
2006). 
13
 In her study of vote buying in eight villages in Zhejiang Province and based on the 
studies of other scholars, Wu Sihong concludes that although democratic governing 
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institutions have been established in most villages and are comprehensive in form, they 
do not function effectively as there are various loopholes (Wu, 2010). 
14
 It is conceivable that this assembly of 32 members evolve into a standing body with its 
own head to effectively represent villagers’ interests and voices.  Thus empowered, it can 
effectively participate in village governance including decision making, supervision and 
management as stipulated in the Organic Law.   
15
 Many scholars including Liangjing Li and John Kennedy argue that most villagers 
including “rightful resisters” would make that distinction between local officials and the 
Party center.  (Li, 2004, 228, 248; Kennedy, 2009, 391). 
16
 The average annual salary for 374 villages in their 2004 national survey was 3,300 
including subsides (James Kung, Yonghsun Cai and Xiulin Sun, 2009: 67).  A large 
village of similar size and better economic conditions near Shijiazhuang, where I did field 
study in 2006, was 3,600 for village director and the Party secretary.   
17
 This was similar to what Zongze Hu had found about the mentality of many villagers in 
a Northern village in Heibei Province: “For them, ‘corruptions are inevitable today.  Just 
let those cadres eat meat [i.e. engage in gross embezzlement] so that we can also drink 
some soup [i.e. gain some modest benefits]’! (Hu, 2008: 629). 
18
 The remarks of O’Brien and Han sound as if those in the empowerment school and 
those in the disempowerment school are quite evenly distributed:  “For every analysts 
who concludes ‘except in a few localities, elections have little positive impact on 
preventing rural authorities from abusing power’, another finds that elections have 
empowered villagers or enhanced accountability” (O’Brien and Han, 2009: notes 107 and 
108, 377).  As far as I can see, those who argue the empowerment effect far outnumber 
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their opponents, especially in the English literature.  I consider Zongze Hu’s 2008 article 
and this article of mine belong to the latter school, although the causes we found are 
different:  While he traces villagers’ negative views on direct elections to their cultural 
mentality, I attribute it to their experience of the poor governance under the elected 
leadership (Hu, 2008:  629-631).  In the English literature, very few scholars who argue 
the disempowerment effect of direct elections have explored actual election process and 
post-election governance, herein lies a major contribution of this study. 
19
 Chen Baifeng refers to the rising problem of village toughs in rural China as “the 
graying of the rural society,” which has driven the political, social and moral order of the 
village communities to the edge of collapse (Chen, 2008: 209-212). 
20
 In the summer of 2010, Beijing municipal and the reconstituted district (still known by 
villagers as “county”) governments worked together to crack down on “evil forces” of 
village toughs and predatory entrepreneurs in at least two villages. The crackdown and 
sentencing process received wide media coverage. The two defendants-- brothers coming 
from the village 10 kilometers south of West Village, were charged with illegal business 
of sand digging and use of violence in village elections and were sentenced to 17 and 8 
years in jail respectively with a fine of 2 million each. The crackdown is part of a larger 
government action and has affected West Village: In October, 2010, the illegal sand 
digging that had lasted over a decade, which had severely drained the village property 
and caused environment damage in the area, finally stopped. This recent development 
indicates that a determined intervention by the state power can effectively contain, if not 
resolve, the problem of village toughs. 
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